Last September, movie fans were introduced to Billy Beane, the General Manager of the Oakland A's. The Brad Pitt film, based on the Michael Lewis book 'Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game', describes how Oakland won 103 games in 2002 despite operating with a limited budget and losing three key players to free agency. The timing of the movie release was interesting. During the same month as the film's release, a real life Moneyball story was developing in the American League. It did not involve Billy Beane's A's, but Andrew Friedman's Tampa Bay Rays. The Rays erased a 9-game deficit that September to earn their third playoff berth in four years. The Rays accomplished that feat despite playing in the same division as the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox, the two teams that boast the highest payrolls in baseball. If Hollywood produced a sequel to Moneyball, the Rays would be more deserving of the silver screen than Oakland. How have the Rays been able to achieve this success? I will explain why the Rays' model of success is sustainable as opposed to the fleeting success of the A's.
The 'Secret' of the A's Success - Starting Pitching
The Oakland A's made a great run from 1999 to 2004 and this cannot be denied. However, the movie ignores the fact that Oakland had the best starting rotation in baseball. Mark Mulder, Tim Hudson, and Barry Zito were consistent and effective. More importantly, they were young and their salaries were under team control until they earned their right to free agency. When those three starting pitchers moved on to teams that could pay fair market value, the A's were unable to replace that effective rotation as a whole. Although young pitchers Dan Haren and Rich Harden were very effective in their time with Oakland, the rotation lost its ability to carry the team to the postseason.
The Rays are built for the long haul. They have stockpiled and developed a talented stable of starting pitchers. The Rays won their first American League pennant in 2008 with a rotation consisting of Scott Kazmir, James Shields, Matt Garza, Andy Sonnanstine, and Edwin Jackson. When the Rays made their dramatic playoff run in 2011, only James Shields remained. Andrew Friedman and the Rays organization have been able to maintain this success on the mound despite a high roster turnover. Each season a new young pitcher is seemingly groomed for the starting rotation. Remarkably the younger pitchers have been more effective than the pitcher they replaced. When Edwin Jackson was traded for current outfielder Matt Joyce after the 2008 season, Jeff Niemann was ready to step into the rotation. When current ace David Price proved that he was ready for the big leagues, he filled Andy Sonnanstine's spot. When Scott Kazmir lost effectiveness due to injury, his salary was moved to the Angels and he was replaced by a more effective and affordable Wade Davis. When the Cubs offered a package of prospects for Matt Garza, he was replaced in the rotation by Jeremy Hellickson, the winner of the American League Rookie of the Year award last season. In 2012, top prospect Matt Moore will replace either Wade Davis or Jeff Niemann. Alex Cobb, who pitched effectively in his 9 starts as an injury replacement, is the 7th starting pitcher on the depth chart. If Cobb pitched for any other team in baseball, he likely would begin 2012 in the starting rotation. With a strong pitching staff that is under team control for several years down the road, the Rays' success is more likely to be sustainable. The Oakland A's, in contrast, seemingly raised the white flag in 2012 by trading away effective young pitchers Trevor Caudill and Gio Gonzalez. Billy Beane may return the A's to prominence, but he is beginning a rebuilding project and will be competing in a tough American League West with the Texas Rangers and Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim.
A Tale of Two Carlos Penas
There's something peculiar about Moneyball's portrayal of Carlos Pena. If you believe the Moneyball narrative, then you believe that Billy Beane courted Scott Hatteberg to replace Jason Giambi at 1B in 2002. That eventually happened, but not without a subplot that is curiously absent from the book and film. Just two weeks after the Hatteberg acquisition, Billy Beane made a multi-player trade with the Rangers to acquire Carlos Pena, Baseball America's 5th ranked prospect. Why aren't moviegoers shown the thrilling scene when Billy Beane finalizes the Carlos Pena trade? The answer is simple. Carlos Pena struggled in Oakland and needed to be written out of the book and movie. Like Moneyball 'stars' Jeremy Giambi, David Justice, and Scott Hatteberg, Carlos Pena gets on base a lot. In 2001, the season before the trade, Carlos had an impressive on-base percentage of .408 and hit a combined 26 home runs in Triple-A and the major leagues. Billy Beane's desire to acquire Pena as a younger and cheaper replacement for Jason Giambi certainly aligns with the Moneyball narrative. Unfortunately for Pena, he was dispatched to Triple-A in late May and then traded to the Detroit Tigers in July.
Carlos Pena's quick exit from Oakland highlights another striking difference between Billy Beane and the Tampa Bay Rays, and that is the virtue of patience. Carlos Pena is a streaky hitter. When Pena is dialed in at the plate and slugging home runs in bunches, he has the ability to carry a team offensively. However, he is prone to extended slumps where the hits are few and the strikeouts are high. The Oakland A's saw the two extremes of Carlos Pena during his brief stay with the team. In April of 2002, Carlos Pena got off to a hot start, hitting 7 home runs that month with an impressive slugging percentage of .552. Pena then failed to hit a home run in May and his slugging percentage plummeted to .419. He was quickly demoted to the minors and traded about six weeks later. Carlos Pena's four years with the Rays were much different. He slugged 46 home runs in 2007 to win the Comeback Player of the Year Award, and his success carried into 2008 when he helped lead the Rays to the World Series. Rays fans can certainly attest to Pena's inconsistency. He had streaks of good fortune followed by bouts of ineffectiveness, especially in 2009 and 2010. Despite the maddening slumps, the Rays organization has shown great patience and has resisted the catcalls to banish Pena to the bench. Pena rewarded the Rays with 4 productive seasons and a couple of division titles, and he thought highly enough of the organization to return as a free agent in 2012. Pena's time with Oakland was merely a footnote in his career, but his Tampa Bay chapter is still being written. It is also important to note that Scott Hatteberg hit only 49 home runs, scored 260 runs and had 263 RBI in his 4 seasons with Oakland. Hatteberg's on-base percentage was .355 and his slugging percentage was .396. By comparison, Carlos Pena hit 144 home runs, scored 330 runs and had 407 RBI in his 4 seasons with Tampa Bay. Pena, who was disfavored by Billy Beane because he didn't get on base as frequently as Hatteberg, had a superior on-base percentage of .368 and slugging percentage of .516 in his 4 seasons with the Rays.
The Boston Red Sox Played Moneyball? Really?
At the end of the film, we are told that Moneyball concepts helped the Boston Red Sox win the World Series in 2004 and 2007. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Boston Red Sox had a final payroll of $130,395,386 in 2004 (2nd in the major leagues to the Yankees) and $155,402,595 in 2007 (also 2nd to the Yankees). It's called Moneyball because the A's didn't have the money to compete with the Yankees and Red Sox, and the inclusion of Johnny Damon in the main story line is perplexing. The story line is built around the fact that the A's could not afford to retain impending free agents Jason Giambi, Johnny Damon, and Jason Isringhausen. The film fails to acknowledge that Johnny Damon signed with the deep-pocketed Red Sox and played an integral part in Boston's championship of 2004. The savvy baseball fan and moviegoer is left to ask, what exactly is Moneyball anyway? Is it allowing a free agent like Johnny Damon to leave via free agency because you can't afford him, or is it the concept of signing a free agent like Johnny Damon because you can afford him. The movie can't have it both ways.
If the producers wanted to cite a true example of a 'have-not' team competing on the same stage as the 'haves', they needed to look no further than the 2003 Florida Marlins. The Marlins won the World Series with a final payroll of $63,281,152 by defeating the New York Yankees (Billy Beane's nemesis) with a final payroll of $180,322,403.
The Joy and Camaraderie in Tampa Bay vs. The Pain and Anguish of Moneyball
For any baseball fan who has paid attention to the Tampa Bay Rays organization recently, there is an amazing positive energy around the ball club. This positive attitude begins at the top of the organization, from Principal Owner Stuart Sternberg to President Matthew Silverman to Andrew Friedman, the Sr. Vice President of Baseball Operations. But a baseball team needs an effective field general to carry out the team's mission and to get the most out of their players. The Rays found the right man for that task. He is Joe Maddon, the two-time manager of the year. Maddon's positive style makes him the ideal leader of this group of young men. Because the Rays have a limited payroll, they must show patience in order to coax the best performances out of their players. Teams with greater payroll flexibility have the ability to make impulsive trades to fill holes and address weaknesses at the mid-season trade deadline. The Rays do not have that luxury. For the most part, the Rays must win with the players who are in the organization during spring training. If a mid-season roster move is made, it is typically to call up a minor league prospect who is ready to help the team right now. Joe Maddon understands that he is leading men, and he treats them with the respect that they deserve as human beings and professionals. Maddon promotes a positive team environment by creating themed road trips. It is all an important part of the team-building experience. Maddon also has developed catchy slogans such as 2008's 9=8 slogan, meaning that 9 players playing 9 innings together can be one of the 8 teams in the playoffs. This camaraderie helps a team forge through a long 162-game season together, especially during the dog days of summer when fatigue and frustration can set in and destroy a group. This positive attitude helps keep the clubhouse loose, and the fruits of Maddon's leadership skills are evident on the field. There are several photos of the Rays that capture a joyful exuberance and a buy-in toward a larger goal. A special memory took place on the final night of the 2011 season, when it appeared that the Rays' amazing pennant run might end in disappointment. The Rays erased a 7 run deficit against the Yankees in dramatic fashion, as pinch-hitter Dan Johnson hit a home run in the bottom of the 9th to tie the game. Evan Longoria then launched the Rays into the playoffs by hitting a game-winning home run down the left-field line. The players and the community will never forget those moments.
The Moneyball movie, by contrast, provides fans with little joy or camaraderie. Billy Beane appears to be playing his own game with Peter Brand and their computer. The entire baseball establishment is the opponent. Beane has disagreements with his scouts and is never on the same page with manager Art Howe. Moneyball is a Hollywood movie with inaccuracies and exaggerations, but it is uncomfortable to see the way Art Howe is portrayed in the film. A casual moviegoer would believe that Howe was a hindrance to the success of the ball club, rather than a leader of men in the dugout. The film is also absent of the magical moments that tell the story of a pennant race. The baseball scenes in Bad News Bears and Naked Gun are more vivid and memorable than the baseball scenes in Moneyball. One of the few dramatic baseball moments in Moneyball is when Scott Hatteberg hits a walk-off home run to extend the A's long winning streak. But that moment simply serves as a reminder that Billy Beane uncovered the hidden talents of an undervalued ballplayer. There is no mention of the baseball contributions of the A's Miguel Tejada, the winner of the 2002 American League MVP award, or of Eric Chavez, who hit 34 home runs and won a Gold Glove. Tejada and Chavez were acquired by the team before Billy Beane became the General Manager. Therefore, their value to the club was minimized in the movie. On the other hand, the Tampa Bay Rays are a true team and everyone shares the spotlight equally. There are no public efforts to minimize the contributions of an executive, a scout, a manager, coach, or player.
It is these reasons why the Rays would be the perfect subject for a Moneyball sequel. But if you can't wait for Hollywood to begin casting the film (Matthew Broderick as Andrew Friedman? Drew Carey as Joe Maddon?), just buy some peanuts and Cracker Jack and sit back and enjoy the Tampa Bay Rays in 2012. This thrilling story is set for release on April 6 and will hopefully end in late October with a World Series championship celebration in Tropicana Field.
Saturday, February 18, 2012
Sunday, January 22, 2012
Why Fausto Carmona Lied About His Age
ESPN recently reported that Cleveland Indians pitcher Fausto Carmona was arrested by authorities in the Dominican Republic under accusations that he used a false identity to try to obtain a U.S. visa. Since then, we have learned that Carmona's actual name is Roberto Hernandez Heredia, and the family of the real Fausto Carmona had been monetarily compensated by Hernandez in exchange for use of his identity. It has also been revealed that Hernandez is three years older than his assumed age. That would make him 31 years of age rather than 28. Some sports fans have reacted to this news with collective indifference, but lying about one's age can reap substantial professional and monetary benefits.
Young baseball players are in a race of sorts. They are racing to get to the major leagues as quickly as possible. There are obvious financial benefits to playing on a major league roster. If a player is talented enough to make it to the major leagues and stay there, then they eventually will become eligible for arbitration. The player can then earn incremental salary increases until becoming a free agent. They can take their talents to the open market and earn whatever another team is willing to pay. Since teams are hesitant to invest a great deal of money or years in an older player, the optimal way for a player to earn a large amount of money is to get to the major leagues at an early age. Therefore, if some unscrupulous players can find a method to make it appear that they are younger than their actual age, some players will game the system. Hopefully, the examples of Roberto Hernandez Heredia, Juan Oviedo (formerly known as Leo Nunez), Miguel Tejada and others are only isolated incidents.
Baseball scouts are always on the lookout for teenage prospects who have the potential to play at the highest level. If two players have similar abilities but one player is three years older than the other, the scouts would devote more resources and show more patience toward the younger player. Ability is the key factor in determining which player is a major league 'prospect', but age is certainly as factor as well. A younger player will be seen as having a higher 'ceiling', or more room for growth and improvement. For example, the player formerly known as Fausto Carmona was purported to be 19 years of age when he pitched in the South Atlantic League (Single A Sally League). He had a fine season at that level, and his ability and his young age resulted in Carmona's rated as the #76 Minor League Prospect by Baseball America. If it was known that Carmona was 22 rather than 19, it is likely that he would not crack the top 100.
A closer look at the 18 and 19 year pitchers in the 2003 South Atlantic League reveals that over 40% of those teenage pitchers eventually made it to the major leagues (13 of 31). However, Carmona's real age was 22. Of the 94 Sally League pitchers in 2003 who were listed at 22 years of age by www.baseball-reference.com, only 18 (fewer than 25%) eventually threw a pitch in the major leagues. It would therefore appear that a player's path to the major leagues would be greased more quickly if they were thought to be younger.
Not only did the teenage Sally League pitcher earn eventual major league promotions at a higher rate, their dollars earned is substantially higher .... almost ridiculously higher. The 22-year old Salley League pitchers who eventually played in the majors would only be known to the most die-hard baseball fan. This list includes Juan Lara, Jose Capellan, Jason Waddell, Bryan Bullington, Jailen Peguero, Mark McLemore, Jesse Carlson, Anderson Garcia, Jeff Ridgway, Alfredo Simon, Ehren Wasserman, Sean Tracey, Darren Clarke, Darrell Rasner, Mike O'Connor, and Chris Smith. The other two pitchers who were 22 years of age in the 2003 Sally League who earned over a million dollars during their major league career are John Maine ($6,741,000) and Daniel Cabrera ($8,010,000). Incidentally, both pitchers are still looking for work. It will be difficult for them since they have already turned 30.
The 18 and 19 year old prospects who pitched in the Salley League that season is a virtual who's who list of the game's finest young pitchers. They are also well-compensated. The Marlins' Josh Johnson is on that list, and he will earn over 40-million dollars by the end of 2013. Matt Cain is on that list also. He just agreed to a contract with San Francisco worth $15 million. By the end of the 2012 season, Cain will have earned over 30-million dollars throughout the course of his career. Others who have earned (or will earn) over 30-million dollars are Scott Kazmir, Cole Hamels, and Jon Lester.
If you are Fausto Carmona (or Roberto Hernandez Heredia) which group would you rather be in? Would you want to be included in a group of pitchers who barely made it to the major leagues, or would you want to be seen as a young, can't miss prospect? A fake identity can do that for you. Instead of having a ball club scrutinize you as a 22 year old ballplayer (he's got decent stuff, but he he's already reached his ceiling), you can have scouts salivate over your potential (he's dominating Single-A, and he's only 19 years old). Through the use of identity theft, Carmona went from being one of the oldest pitcher on his Single-A team to being the youngest. That type of deception, if undetected, can certainly help your career advancement. Prior to the 2012 season, Carmona had earned over 15-million dollars playing Major League Baseball. In this offseason, he signed a deal which would give him 7-million in 2012, with the Indians holding team options in 2013 (9-million) and 2014 (12 million).
Which leads to my final point. Sometimes it isn't enough to prove that you are a star. You must also prove that you are a star at a young age. If you look at the 13 most lucrative free agent contracts in the history of the game, they were all signed by players who had debuted in the major leagues before their 23rd birthday. There are a few reasons for this. The most obvious reason is that the great players show their greatness at a young age, and they are paid their true value in an open market. A related reason is the fact that such players who make an early major league debut are more likely to hit the free agency market when they are in their mid-to-late twenties. Such stars are in a great position to take full advantage of the free agency market because they still have many productive years. This provides an added incentive for a dishonest player to game the system.
In closing, there have been two glaring ways in which a baseball player can cheat the system on the front end and the back end of their careers. The rampant use of steroids and performance-enhancing drugs assisted several players in extending their careers. The increase in home runs helped these players make substantial amounts of money through their careers, and they earned money in their late 30s and early 40s that they never would have earned without this artificial enhancement. By the same token, dishonest players have cheated the system on the front end of their careers and throughout by lying about their age. This is a serious problem because the players who are honest about their age and who have avoided performance-enhancers are at a disadvantage. It is likely that honest minor leaguers missed out on opportunities because a ball club chose to promote a 'younger' player with more potential. It is also highly likely that clean players lost jobs at the major league level because they did not have the 'power' potential of a player who benefited from the use of performance-enhancers. That is why it is important for Major League Baseball to implement strong measures to ensure the integrity of the game. To that end, a firm stance must be taken against the former Fausto Carmona and Leo Nunez.
Young baseball players are in a race of sorts. They are racing to get to the major leagues as quickly as possible. There are obvious financial benefits to playing on a major league roster. If a player is talented enough to make it to the major leagues and stay there, then they eventually will become eligible for arbitration. The player can then earn incremental salary increases until becoming a free agent. They can take their talents to the open market and earn whatever another team is willing to pay. Since teams are hesitant to invest a great deal of money or years in an older player, the optimal way for a player to earn a large amount of money is to get to the major leagues at an early age. Therefore, if some unscrupulous players can find a method to make it appear that they are younger than their actual age, some players will game the system. Hopefully, the examples of Roberto Hernandez Heredia, Juan Oviedo (formerly known as Leo Nunez), Miguel Tejada and others are only isolated incidents.
Baseball scouts are always on the lookout for teenage prospects who have the potential to play at the highest level. If two players have similar abilities but one player is three years older than the other, the scouts would devote more resources and show more patience toward the younger player. Ability is the key factor in determining which player is a major league 'prospect', but age is certainly as factor as well. A younger player will be seen as having a higher 'ceiling', or more room for growth and improvement. For example, the player formerly known as Fausto Carmona was purported to be 19 years of age when he pitched in the South Atlantic League (Single A Sally League). He had a fine season at that level, and his ability and his young age resulted in Carmona's rated as the #76 Minor League Prospect by Baseball America. If it was known that Carmona was 22 rather than 19, it is likely that he would not crack the top 100.
A closer look at the 18 and 19 year pitchers in the 2003 South Atlantic League reveals that over 40% of those teenage pitchers eventually made it to the major leagues (13 of 31). However, Carmona's real age was 22. Of the 94 Sally League pitchers in 2003 who were listed at 22 years of age by www.baseball-reference.com, only 18 (fewer than 25%) eventually threw a pitch in the major leagues. It would therefore appear that a player's path to the major leagues would be greased more quickly if they were thought to be younger.
Not only did the teenage Sally League pitcher earn eventual major league promotions at a higher rate, their dollars earned is substantially higher .... almost ridiculously higher. The 22-year old Salley League pitchers who eventually played in the majors would only be known to the most die-hard baseball fan. This list includes Juan Lara, Jose Capellan, Jason Waddell, Bryan Bullington, Jailen Peguero, Mark McLemore, Jesse Carlson, Anderson Garcia, Jeff Ridgway, Alfredo Simon, Ehren Wasserman, Sean Tracey, Darren Clarke, Darrell Rasner, Mike O'Connor, and Chris Smith. The other two pitchers who were 22 years of age in the 2003 Sally League who earned over a million dollars during their major league career are John Maine ($6,741,000) and Daniel Cabrera ($8,010,000). Incidentally, both pitchers are still looking for work. It will be difficult for them since they have already turned 30.
The 18 and 19 year old prospects who pitched in the Salley League that season is a virtual who's who list of the game's finest young pitchers. They are also well-compensated. The Marlins' Josh Johnson is on that list, and he will earn over 40-million dollars by the end of 2013. Matt Cain is on that list also. He just agreed to a contract with San Francisco worth $15 million. By the end of the 2012 season, Cain will have earned over 30-million dollars throughout the course of his career. Others who have earned (or will earn) over 30-million dollars are Scott Kazmir, Cole Hamels, and Jon Lester.
If you are Fausto Carmona (or Roberto Hernandez Heredia) which group would you rather be in? Would you want to be included in a group of pitchers who barely made it to the major leagues, or would you want to be seen as a young, can't miss prospect? A fake identity can do that for you. Instead of having a ball club scrutinize you as a 22 year old ballplayer (he's got decent stuff, but he he's already reached his ceiling), you can have scouts salivate over your potential (he's dominating Single-A, and he's only 19 years old). Through the use of identity theft, Carmona went from being one of the oldest pitcher on his Single-A team to being the youngest. That type of deception, if undetected, can certainly help your career advancement. Prior to the 2012 season, Carmona had earned over 15-million dollars playing Major League Baseball. In this offseason, he signed a deal which would give him 7-million in 2012, with the Indians holding team options in 2013 (9-million) and 2014 (12 million).
Which leads to my final point. Sometimes it isn't enough to prove that you are a star. You must also prove that you are a star at a young age. If you look at the 13 most lucrative free agent contracts in the history of the game, they were all signed by players who had debuted in the major leagues before their 23rd birthday. There are a few reasons for this. The most obvious reason is that the great players show their greatness at a young age, and they are paid their true value in an open market. A related reason is the fact that such players who make an early major league debut are more likely to hit the free agency market when they are in their mid-to-late twenties. Such stars are in a great position to take full advantage of the free agency market because they still have many productive years. This provides an added incentive for a dishonest player to game the system.
In closing, there have been two glaring ways in which a baseball player can cheat the system on the front end and the back end of their careers. The rampant use of steroids and performance-enhancing drugs assisted several players in extending their careers. The increase in home runs helped these players make substantial amounts of money through their careers, and they earned money in their late 30s and early 40s that they never would have earned without this artificial enhancement. By the same token, dishonest players have cheated the system on the front end of their careers and throughout by lying about their age. This is a serious problem because the players who are honest about their age and who have avoided performance-enhancers are at a disadvantage. It is likely that honest minor leaguers missed out on opportunities because a ball club chose to promote a 'younger' player with more potential. It is also highly likely that clean players lost jobs at the major league level because they did not have the 'power' potential of a player who benefited from the use of performance-enhancers. That is why it is important for Major League Baseball to implement strong measures to ensure the integrity of the game. To that end, a firm stance must be taken against the former Fausto Carmona and Leo Nunez.
Monday, January 16, 2012
A Black QB in 1968 - Marlin Briscoe's Struggle
1968 was a tumultuous time in our nation. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated on April 4th. Presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated on June 5th, and there were riots at the Democratic convention in late August. In October of that year, African-American athletes Tommie Smith and John Carlos gave the 'Black Power" salute at the Mexico City Olympics.
In the fall of 1968, Marlin Briscoe was waging a lesser known battle - the battle to become a starting quarterback in the American Football League (AFL). Briscoe, who had been selected by the Denver Broncos out of the University of Nebraska-Omaha in the 14th round of the 1968 draft, was actually selected as a defensive back. However, he requested a three-day trial at the quarterback position. Although Briscoe didn't believe he would get a 'fair shake', he relished the opportunity to showcase his skills. Marlin "The Magician" got his chance to play quarterback in his rookie year, mainly out of necessity. The Denver Broncos of the late '60s were a bad football team, and Briscoe made the most of his opportunity.
Marlin Briscoe finished his rookie season with 93 completions on 224 attempts for 1,589 yards. His 17.1 yards per completion led the AFL, and he threw 14 touchdown passes and only 13 interceptions. Those statistics may not seem impressive in today's age of inflated video game statistics, but Briscoe was only one of four AFL quarterbacks to throw more TDs than interceptions in 1968. The other three were Daryle Lamonica and Hall of Famers Len Dawson and Bob Griese. Even Joe Namath, who later that season would make good on his Super Bowl 'guarantee', threw more interceptions than touchdowns. Although Marlin Briscoe had a low completion percentage, that was also a sign of the times. In the 1968 AFL, only Len Dawson and Bob Griese completed more than 50% of their passes. Briscoe also chipped in with 308 rushing yards (on only 41 attempts) and 3 rushing touchdowns. At that point in the history of the Denver Broncos, Marlin Briscoe was the ONLY QB in franchise history to finish a season with more passing TDs than interceptions, and he did it as a rookie. In 1962, Denver sent a QB to the AFL All-Star game (Frank Tripucka), and even in that season he tossed 25 interceptions compared to 17 TDs.
After such a promising rookie season, Marlin Briscoe surely had proven himself. He would be invited back in 1969 to battle for the starting quarterback position, right? Sadly, the answer was a resounding no. Briscoe would not receive a quarterbacking opportunity with Denver, so he asked for his release prior to the 1969 season. Marlin signed with the Buffalo Bills in 1969 to play the position of flanker/wide receiver. He caught 32 passes in 1969 and earned a spot on the 1970 Pro Bowl team when he broke the 1,000 yard barrier on 57 catches and scored 8 TDs. Miami Dolphins fans remember Marlin Briscoe as a key performer on the Super Bowl teams of the early 1970s. Briscoe signed with Miami before the 1972 undefeated season and he led the Dolphins in receptions in their 1973 championship season. He only threw 9 passes in his career after his promising rookie season.
Although Marlin Briscoe was part of a perfect season and earned two Super Bowl rings, one could only wonder what was going through his mind when he saw that only white quarterbacks were given an opportunity to play the position. When Briscoe signed with Miami, he was not given an opportunity to play the position. He wasn't even the 2nd string quarterback. Earl Morrall was signed to fill that position. Briscoe was not even considered as the 3rd string quarterback. That honor went to the undrafted Jim Del Gaizo.
We could only imagine the frustration that Marlin Briscoe could have felt when he saw that the Denver Broncos signed Pete Liske to be the backup quarterback in 1969. After all, hadn't Briscoe shown enough during his rookie season to deserve a chance to compete? For the record, Briscoe says that the incumbent starting QB, Steve Tensi, was a good man. He apologized to Marlin Briscoe later and said there was nothing he could do. But what about the decision to replace Briscoe with Pete Liske? Liske's only pro experience prior to 1969 was FIVE years earlier, when he went 9 for 18 for 55 yards (and 2 interceptions) for the 1964 New York Jets. Pete Liske was a 27 year old man who had been out of football for 5 years and who had never thrown a TD pass, but he ultimately became Steve Tensi's backup. Fortunately for Pete Liske, his skin color was white.
What was going through Marlin Briscoe's mind when he saw white QBs fail but continue to receive opportunities? Marty Domres, Terry Hanratty, and Bobby Douglass were drafted in 1969 but had poor rookie seasons. These white QBs, however, remained in the NFL for several years. Bobby Douglass, in particular, was a highly inaccurate quarterback and was a much better runner than passer. Yet he survived in the NFL for ten years without being forced to change positions. The NFL draft in 1969 is noteworthy for another reason. There is only one quarterback from that draft who earned a Pro Bowl berth. That was James Harris, a black quarterback who was the 7th QB selected, and he was not taken until the 8th round. It took James Harris five seasons before he was given an opportunity to earn a starting job. Domres, Hanratty, and Douglass did not have to wait nearly as long to receive their chance.
There were many black quarterbacks who paved the way for today's current starters - James Harris, Joe Gilliam, Vince Evans, Doug Williams, and then Warren Moon. But we must not forget Marlin Briscoe, the man who attempted to pave the way but ran into a roadblock.
Sources for this blog: http://www.20yardline.com/current/marlin-briscoe-the-first-black-nfl-starting-quarterback.html and http://www.pro-football-reference.com/ Also, I eagerly await this upcoming film: http://www.marlinbriscoemovie.com/
In the fall of 1968, Marlin Briscoe was waging a lesser known battle - the battle to become a starting quarterback in the American Football League (AFL). Briscoe, who had been selected by the Denver Broncos out of the University of Nebraska-Omaha in the 14th round of the 1968 draft, was actually selected as a defensive back. However, he requested a three-day trial at the quarterback position. Although Briscoe didn't believe he would get a 'fair shake', he relished the opportunity to showcase his skills. Marlin "The Magician" got his chance to play quarterback in his rookie year, mainly out of necessity. The Denver Broncos of the late '60s were a bad football team, and Briscoe made the most of his opportunity.
Marlin Briscoe finished his rookie season with 93 completions on 224 attempts for 1,589 yards. His 17.1 yards per completion led the AFL, and he threw 14 touchdown passes and only 13 interceptions. Those statistics may not seem impressive in today's age of inflated video game statistics, but Briscoe was only one of four AFL quarterbacks to throw more TDs than interceptions in 1968. The other three were Daryle Lamonica and Hall of Famers Len Dawson and Bob Griese. Even Joe Namath, who later that season would make good on his Super Bowl 'guarantee', threw more interceptions than touchdowns. Although Marlin Briscoe had a low completion percentage, that was also a sign of the times. In the 1968 AFL, only Len Dawson and Bob Griese completed more than 50% of their passes. Briscoe also chipped in with 308 rushing yards (on only 41 attempts) and 3 rushing touchdowns. At that point in the history of the Denver Broncos, Marlin Briscoe was the ONLY QB in franchise history to finish a season with more passing TDs than interceptions, and he did it as a rookie. In 1962, Denver sent a QB to the AFL All-Star game (Frank Tripucka), and even in that season he tossed 25 interceptions compared to 17 TDs.
After such a promising rookie season, Marlin Briscoe surely had proven himself. He would be invited back in 1969 to battle for the starting quarterback position, right? Sadly, the answer was a resounding no. Briscoe would not receive a quarterbacking opportunity with Denver, so he asked for his release prior to the 1969 season. Marlin signed with the Buffalo Bills in 1969 to play the position of flanker/wide receiver. He caught 32 passes in 1969 and earned a spot on the 1970 Pro Bowl team when he broke the 1,000 yard barrier on 57 catches and scored 8 TDs. Miami Dolphins fans remember Marlin Briscoe as a key performer on the Super Bowl teams of the early 1970s. Briscoe signed with Miami before the 1972 undefeated season and he led the Dolphins in receptions in their 1973 championship season. He only threw 9 passes in his career after his promising rookie season.
Although Marlin Briscoe was part of a perfect season and earned two Super Bowl rings, one could only wonder what was going through his mind when he saw that only white quarterbacks were given an opportunity to play the position. When Briscoe signed with Miami, he was not given an opportunity to play the position. He wasn't even the 2nd string quarterback. Earl Morrall was signed to fill that position. Briscoe was not even considered as the 3rd string quarterback. That honor went to the undrafted Jim Del Gaizo.
We could only imagine the frustration that Marlin Briscoe could have felt when he saw that the Denver Broncos signed Pete Liske to be the backup quarterback in 1969. After all, hadn't Briscoe shown enough during his rookie season to deserve a chance to compete? For the record, Briscoe says that the incumbent starting QB, Steve Tensi, was a good man. He apologized to Marlin Briscoe later and said there was nothing he could do. But what about the decision to replace Briscoe with Pete Liske? Liske's only pro experience prior to 1969 was FIVE years earlier, when he went 9 for 18 for 55 yards (and 2 interceptions) for the 1964 New York Jets. Pete Liske was a 27 year old man who had been out of football for 5 years and who had never thrown a TD pass, but he ultimately became Steve Tensi's backup. Fortunately for Pete Liske, his skin color was white.
What was going through Marlin Briscoe's mind when he saw white QBs fail but continue to receive opportunities? Marty Domres, Terry Hanratty, and Bobby Douglass were drafted in 1969 but had poor rookie seasons. These white QBs, however, remained in the NFL for several years. Bobby Douglass, in particular, was a highly inaccurate quarterback and was a much better runner than passer. Yet he survived in the NFL for ten years without being forced to change positions. The NFL draft in 1969 is noteworthy for another reason. There is only one quarterback from that draft who earned a Pro Bowl berth. That was James Harris, a black quarterback who was the 7th QB selected, and he was not taken until the 8th round. It took James Harris five seasons before he was given an opportunity to earn a starting job. Domres, Hanratty, and Douglass did not have to wait nearly as long to receive their chance.
There were many black quarterbacks who paved the way for today's current starters - James Harris, Joe Gilliam, Vince Evans, Doug Williams, and then Warren Moon. But we must not forget Marlin Briscoe, the man who attempted to pave the way but ran into a roadblock.
Sources for this blog: http://www.20yardline.com/current/marlin-briscoe-the-first-black-nfl-starting-quarterback.html and http://www.pro-football-reference.com/ Also, I eagerly await this upcoming film: http://www.marlinbriscoemovie.com/
Monday, January 2, 2012
Houston and Cincinnati - Just Happy To Be Here
The first playoff weekend is normally a glorious time for NFL fans. We are treated to two playoff games on Saturday and two more on Sunday. I can't get as excited this year, for the AFC has given us an opening game between two mediocre teams. Pardon me if I can't muster up any excitement for the Houston Texans and the Cincinnati Bengals, or as I like to call it, the "Just Happy To Be Here" Bowl. The timing of this game should not be lost on NFL fans. The loser of this game will be put out their misery early, while the winner will have extra time to prepare for the 2nd round match-up. They will surely need it.
The Bengals roared off to a 6-2 start, but faded down the stretch. Their schedule stiffened in the second half of the season, and they stumbled to a 9-7 finish. The Bengals are the embodiment of mediocrity. They had a 1-6 record against teams that finished with a winning record, including an 0-4 record against division rivals Baltimore and Pittsburgh. The Bengals benefited from a 7-0 record against teams currently under .500, and they split their 2 games against 8-8 teams.
The Houston Texans got off to a hot start, and they continued to win after starting QB Matt Schaub suffered a season-ending injury. Matt Leinart made a brief cameo before getting injured himself, and the Texans were forced to start rookie T.J. Yates. The Texans won Yates' first two starts and appeared to be heading toward a first round bye, but the bottom fell out. In their final three games, Houston lost to NFL powerhouses Carolina, Indianapolis, and Tennessee. Oh, and they might be down to their fourth QB of the season - Jake Delhomme.
After the conclusion of the Texans/Bengals game, the upstart and exciting Detroit Lions will face off against the offensive juggernaut known as the New Orleans Saints. It's a shame that one of these teams has to lose in week 1 while either Houston or Cincinnati will advance to the second round of the playoffs.
Sunday, January 1, 2012
Ryan Theriot Makes Sense for the Rays (at the right price)
The new year is here, and we are one day closer to Spring Training. The Tampa Bay Rays have made a few acquisitions to solidify the Catcher position (Jose Molina) and to strengthen the bullpen (Josh Lueke and Burke Badenhop). But will the Rays be satisfied going into Spring Training with Ben Zobrist, Sean Rodriguez, Reid Brignac, and Elliot Johnson battling for playing time at 2B and SS? Based on the Rays' recent history, there is every reason to believe that another acquisition will be made to solidify the defense up the middle. The player best suited to fill this role is Ryan Theriot, provided that the price tag is not too high.
The Rays have made several minor free agent signings in recent years to acquire infield talent and organizational depth at Triple-A. Prior to 2009, Adam Kennedy was signed and sent to Triple-A Durham. Kennedy was then traded to Oakland for utility player Joe Dillon, who was resigned prior to the 2010 season. Before the start of 2011, two such players were brought in - Felipe Lopez and Joe Inglett.
Joe Dillon and Felipe Lopez spent some time at Tropicana Field, mainly due to injuries. Adam Kennedy and Joe Inglett, however, weren't needed and were moved in trades. In 2012, the Rays will likely need to strengthen their middle infield. Based on the lefty/righty platoon splits and defensive abilities, a potential signing of Ryan Theriot makes perfect sense.
We must first look at Ryan Theriot's splits against right-handed and left-handed pitchers. As a right-handed batter, Theriot's numbers are noticeably stronger against lefties:
Theriot 2011 vs. LHP - .310 batting average - .356 on-base percentage - .413 slugging percentage
Theriot career vs. LHP - .301 batting average - .373 on-base percentage - .401 slugging percentage
Theriot 2011 vs. RHP - .256 batting average - .307 on-base percentage - .313 slugging percentage
Theriot career vs. RHP - .276 batting average - .334 on-base percentage - .337 slugging percentage
The remaining middle infield candidates have the following offensive splits:
S. Rodriguez 2011 vs. LHP - .273 batting average - .389 on-base percentage - .475 slugging percentage
S. Rodriguez career vs. LHP - .260 batting average - .360 on-base percentage - .422 slugging percentage
S. Rodriguez 2011 vs. RHP - .192 batting average - .280 on-base percentage - .286 slugging percentage
S. Rodriguez career vs. RHP - .212 batting average - .278 on-base percentage - .337 slugging percentage
The above numbers reveal that Sean Rodriguez is a much better hitter against left-handed pitchers. His numbers improved against lefties in 2011, but he actually took a step back against right-handed pitchers. He will need to take a step forward in 2012 to earn more playing time.
The following statistics for Reid Brignac are not good:
Brignac 2011 vs. LHP - .150 batting average - .190 on-base percentage - .150 slugging percentage
Brignac career vs. LHP - .160 batting average - .231 on-base percentage - .189 slugging percentage
Brignac 2011 vs. RHP - .201 batting average - .234 on-base percentage - .234 slugging percentage
Brignac career vs. RHP - .244 batting average - .281 on-base percentage - .351 slugging percentage
Brignac is a very good defensive shortstop, but he has struggled mightily at the plate. His struggles are more glaring against left-handed pitchers. Unfortunately, Elliot Johnson's numbers in 2011 are not much better:
E. Johnson 2011 vs. LHP - .176 batting average - .200 on-base percentage - .330 slugging percentage
E. Johnson 2011 vs. RHP - .207 batting average - .296 on-base percentage - .310 slugging percentage
In recent years, Ben Zobrist has manned 2B against right-handed pitchers. When a left-handed pitcher is on the mound, Ben normally moves to RF and moves Matt Joyce to the bench. Zobrist's numbers look like this:
Zobrist 2011 vs. LHP - .303 batting average - .372 on-base percentage - .535 slugging percentage
Zobrist career vs. LHP - .278 batting average - .365 on-base percentage - .464 slugging percentage
Zobrist 2011 vs. RHP - .256 batting average - .348 on-base percentage - .445 slugging percentage
Zobrist career vs. RHP - .247 batting average - .340 on-base percentage - .420 slugging percentage
There is more to baseball than offense. Glovework is also a huge consideration, especially for a team like Tampa Bay. A high priority is placed on pitching and defense. While Ryan Theriot is a solid 2B (38 defensive runs saved above average per 1200 innings in 2011), his age is showing at SS (19 runs below average in the same statistical category).
Therefore, Ryan Theriot should be a candidate for the Rays' infield, but only at 2B. How would Joe Maddon and the Rays manage such a platoon? Well, it gets a bit complicated.
Against the majority of left-handed starting pitchers, the Rays could start Theriot at 2B and Rodriguez at SS. Ben Zobrist could move to RF, thereby moving Joyce to the bench or to the DH spot.
Agianst the majority of right-handed starting pitchers, the Rays could start Ben Zobrist at 2B and Reid Brignac at SS. Matt Joyce would start in RF.
There are many contingencies to this plan:
(1) Ryan Theriot needs to be available at a reasonable salary. The Rays will not know how much they have to spend until decisions are made regarding 1B and DH. Casey Kotchman could return at 1B, but if he signs elsewhere the Rays need to fill that hole. Johnny Damon is a candidate to return, but the Rays need to wait for both of these dominoes to fall before turning to their middle infield. Further complicating the situation is the possibility that a starting pitcher could be moved in order to obtain a 1B prospect. Moving a pitcher would impact the 2012 payroll and it may free money up for a middle infielder.
(2) Reid Brignac needs to turn things around after a horrible offensive season in 2011. His defense is very good and valuable to a young pitching staff, but he fails to get on base or hit for power. I note that Elliot Johnson is not mentioned in the above platoon situations, but he will have an opportunity to win a job with the Rays. As with Brignac, Elliot Johnson needs to improve offensively to earn a spot in a platoon.
Even if Theriot is not signed, there will be plenty of competition in the middle infield for the Rays. Sean Rodriguez will be seeking to earn more consistent playing time, and he will be given a shot to win the SS job. Reid Brignac will not have anything handed to him. He knows the challenge, which is to improve his command of the plate. Elliot Johnson will be trying to win playing time at SS, and he will be trying to show his value as a utility infielder.
If Theriot is signed, then it will improve the competition in Spring Training. It will give the Rays many interesting options in 2012, and he could be a key cog in their drive toward the 2012 postseason.
Saturday, December 31, 2011
Moneyball Criticism: The Peculiar Portrayal of Carlos Pena
By now, most baseball nuts have seen Moneyball, an entertaining movie about General Manager Billy Beane's struggle to put a winning team on the field in Oakland despite being hamstrung with a ridiculously low budget. Billy Beane is faced with this predicament after the 2001 season - How do you replace the bats of impending free agents Jason Giambi and Johnny Damon in the lineup? Beane and Paul DePodesta have an innovative solution. There is no single player who can replace Giambi (at least not on such a tight budget), but you can replace Giambi, CF Damon, and DH Olmedo Saenz with Jason's brother Jeremy, who would play left field, and the aging David Justice would be installed as the designated hitter. Terrence Long would play center field, and Boston catcher Scott Hatteberg would be signed as a free agent and converted to play 1B. A cost-effective plan, yes. But is the Moneyball account completely accurate? Probably not. There's something that Billy Beane, author Michael Lewis, Brad Pitt, and Jonah Hill aren't telling us. They are not telling us about Carlos Pena.
One of the better scenes in Moneyball is when Billy Beane shows up unannounced at Scott Hatteberg's house in the offseason. Billy is prepared to offer the skeptical Scott Hatteberg a contract to be the A's new first baseman. According to baseball-reference.com, Hatteberg signs his new contract with Oakland on January 2, 2002. With David Justice already in the fold (he was acquired from the Mets in December 2001), Billy Beane's master plan was already in place, right? Well, not entirely so. There is a major trade that Moneyball conveniently omits.
On January 14, 2002, a mere twelve days after Oakland supposedly acquires his new first baseman, Billy Beane makes a major trade to acquire another first baseman. This was no minor trade of spare parts or non-prospects, either. The Oakland A's traded prospects Ryan Ludwick, Gerald Laird, Jason Hart, and Mario Ramos to the Texas Rangers for Carlos Pena and relief pitcher Mike Venafro. Carlos Pena, who played no other position besides first base, in actuality was the player acquired to replace Jason Giambi at first.
Carlos Pena was quickly rising through the Texas Rangers' minor league system after he was drafted out of Northeastern in the 1st round of the 1998 amateur draft. In 1999, Pena hit 18 home runs for Charlotte (High Single-A) of the Florida State League. In 2000, Carlos hit 28 home runs for Double-A Tulsa. After Pena's productive season in Double-A, he was rated as the #11 prospect in the minor leagues by Baseball America. Pena's good fortune continued in 2001, when he hit 23 home runs for Triple-A Oklahoma in only 119 games before earning a September call-up with the Rangers. Carlos Pena handled himself well as a 23-year old prospect in his first stint in the major leagues, hitting .258 with 3 home runs in 62 at-bats. At the conclusion of the 2001 season, Pena was now ranked as the #5 prospect by Baseball America.
But there is yet another reason why Billy Beane likely believed that Carlos Pena fit the Moneyball profile - It was Pena's ability to get on base. This was the main reason why David Justice and Scott Hatteberg were so valuable and in part why Johnny Damon was replaceable, at least according to Moneyball. Brad Pitt and Jonah Hill viewed on base percentage as an undervalued quality in the baseball marketplace. If you look at Carlos Pena's statistics in the two seasons prior to his trade to Oakland, he got on base .... a lot. In 2000, Pena's Double-A on base percentage was an impressive .414. He walked 101 times in 138 games. In 2001, Carlos continued to impress in Triple-A. He walked 80 times in 119 games for a .408 on base percentage. Carlos Pena fit the profile of everything that Billy Beane wanted in a player. He got on base and he came cheap. Pena was a top prospect who was heading into his rookie year in 2002, a dream acquisition for a small market General Manager.
However, if we are to believe Moneyball, then Scott Hatteberg was the guy Billy Beane wanted all along. But if you study Hatteberg's pre-Oakland numbers, they don't exactly jump off the page. In his Boston career, Hatteberg batted a decent .267 with a pretty good on base percentage of .357. His slugging percentage of .414 wasn't exactly what a General Manager is looking for in a first baseman.
While it is true that Billy Beane made a savvy decision by signing an undervalued Hatteberg, the book and movie sweep the Carlos Pena trade under the rug. Why is that so? It is because Pena slumped in May of 2002 and a productive April, and he needed to be 'written out of the script'. After all, this was a trade that was made under Billy Beane's watch.
The result on the big screen is that Carlos Pena is portrayed as a flawed player who needed to be moved so Scott Hatteberg could man first base. This leads to some serious questions. If Scott Hatteberg is the embodiment of the Moneyball theory, then why did Billy Beane trade for Carlos Pena twelve days after the Hatteberg signing? If Carlos Pena was such a flawed player in May (note - Pena was not traded while in the majors. He actually was send down to Triple-A in May 2002 and then traded several weeks later), then why did Billy Beane trade 4 players to get him four months earlier in January, when he was the #5 prospect in baseball? Is Billy Beane cherry-picking only the player acquisitions that portray him in a positive light?
Does it even matter? After all, Billy Beane was portrayed by Brad Pitt in the big screen. He is the one who has the last laugh.
One of the better scenes in Moneyball is when Billy Beane shows up unannounced at Scott Hatteberg's house in the offseason. Billy is prepared to offer the skeptical Scott Hatteberg a contract to be the A's new first baseman. According to baseball-reference.com, Hatteberg signs his new contract with Oakland on January 2, 2002. With David Justice already in the fold (he was acquired from the Mets in December 2001), Billy Beane's master plan was already in place, right? Well, not entirely so. There is a major trade that Moneyball conveniently omits.
On January 14, 2002, a mere twelve days after Oakland supposedly acquires his new first baseman, Billy Beane makes a major trade to acquire another first baseman. This was no minor trade of spare parts or non-prospects, either. The Oakland A's traded prospects Ryan Ludwick, Gerald Laird, Jason Hart, and Mario Ramos to the Texas Rangers for Carlos Pena and relief pitcher Mike Venafro. Carlos Pena, who played no other position besides first base, in actuality was the player acquired to replace Jason Giambi at first.
Carlos Pena was quickly rising through the Texas Rangers' minor league system after he was drafted out of Northeastern in the 1st round of the 1998 amateur draft. In 1999, Pena hit 18 home runs for Charlotte (High Single-A) of the Florida State League. In 2000, Carlos hit 28 home runs for Double-A Tulsa. After Pena's productive season in Double-A, he was rated as the #11 prospect in the minor leagues by Baseball America. Pena's good fortune continued in 2001, when he hit 23 home runs for Triple-A Oklahoma in only 119 games before earning a September call-up with the Rangers. Carlos Pena handled himself well as a 23-year old prospect in his first stint in the major leagues, hitting .258 with 3 home runs in 62 at-bats. At the conclusion of the 2001 season, Pena was now ranked as the #5 prospect by Baseball America.
But there is yet another reason why Billy Beane likely believed that Carlos Pena fit the Moneyball profile - It was Pena's ability to get on base. This was the main reason why David Justice and Scott Hatteberg were so valuable and in part why Johnny Damon was replaceable, at least according to Moneyball. Brad Pitt and Jonah Hill viewed on base percentage as an undervalued quality in the baseball marketplace. If you look at Carlos Pena's statistics in the two seasons prior to his trade to Oakland, he got on base .... a lot. In 2000, Pena's Double-A on base percentage was an impressive .414. He walked 101 times in 138 games. In 2001, Carlos continued to impress in Triple-A. He walked 80 times in 119 games for a .408 on base percentage. Carlos Pena fit the profile of everything that Billy Beane wanted in a player. He got on base and he came cheap. Pena was a top prospect who was heading into his rookie year in 2002, a dream acquisition for a small market General Manager.
However, if we are to believe Moneyball, then Scott Hatteberg was the guy Billy Beane wanted all along. But if you study Hatteberg's pre-Oakland numbers, they don't exactly jump off the page. In his Boston career, Hatteberg batted a decent .267 with a pretty good on base percentage of .357. His slugging percentage of .414 wasn't exactly what a General Manager is looking for in a first baseman.
While it is true that Billy Beane made a savvy decision by signing an undervalued Hatteberg, the book and movie sweep the Carlos Pena trade under the rug. Why is that so? It is because Pena slumped in May of 2002 and a productive April, and he needed to be 'written out of the script'. After all, this was a trade that was made under Billy Beane's watch.
The result on the big screen is that Carlos Pena is portrayed as a flawed player who needed to be moved so Scott Hatteberg could man first base. This leads to some serious questions. If Scott Hatteberg is the embodiment of the Moneyball theory, then why did Billy Beane trade for Carlos Pena twelve days after the Hatteberg signing? If Carlos Pena was such a flawed player in May (note - Pena was not traded while in the majors. He actually was send down to Triple-A in May 2002 and then traded several weeks later), then why did Billy Beane trade 4 players to get him four months earlier in January, when he was the #5 prospect in baseball? Is Billy Beane cherry-picking only the player acquisitions that portray him in a positive light?
Does it even matter? After all, Billy Beane was portrayed by Brad Pitt in the big screen. He is the one who has the last laugh.
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